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Mitigating the Problem of Vulture Holdout: 
International Certification Boards for Sovereign Debt Restructurings 
John A. E. Pottow, University of Michigan Law School, August 2013. 
 
The Great Recession has brought greater sovereign debt defaults, which in turn has 
brought a surfeit of academic explorations and policy discussions of sovereign debt restructuring.  
The purpose of this article is to offer yet one more idea for the hopper of what to do with the 
seemingly intractable problem of restructuring sovereign bond debt.1  The field does not lack for 
statutory and contractual proposals, from SDRM to CACs, but it is not yet sufficiently saturated 
that another proposal cannot join the mix.2  The proposal is for the establishment of international 
certification boards that can give a stamp of approval to workout proposals for bond debt that is 
(at least in part) privately held. The reason for the boards is to combat the problem of holdouts in 
an age of vulture funds and other new-age sovereign debt investors. The boards are deliberately 
non-judicial and will have no hard law power by design.  Nonetheless, it is suggested that these 
boards will have an incremental effect in coalescing agreement around sovereign debt 
restructuring proposals. 
To make the case of the boards requires some foundational legwork.  First, this article 
discusses the persistence of the holdout problem in sovereign debt restructurings.  Second, it 
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accentuate and indeed crystallize the holdout problem, arguing not just a problem of holdouts 
qua holdouts, but of pernicious knock-on effects to the international legal order generally and to 
the law of sovereign debt particularly.  The foundation thus laid, consideration proceeds to 
certification boards and how they might play a role in combatting these problems. 
I. Holdout: Still a Problem with Sovereign Debt Restructurings. 
The initial proposition that animates this proposal is a firm conviction that of all the 
challenges to sovereign debt default that have been well documented by others (moral hazard, 
taxpayer burden, odiousness, etc.), the principal one—at least for those coming from the world of 
bankruptcy—is that of holdout.  One of the key attributes of a bankruptcy system is the ability to 
bind all stakeholders to an in rem resolution of restructured obligations,3 and more specifically 
the ability to bind holdouts to blunt their potentially destructive impulses.4  
Indeed, in the high-profile dispute between NML and Argentina in the Second Circuit, 
the court has repeatedly bemoaned the lack of a bankruptcy system to turn to as a way out of the 

























the terms of the specific contracts before it.”6  Accordingly, the holdout problem not just real but a 
serious challenge in need of continued attention by policymakers. 
This concern over holdouts is fully mindful of the limited incidence of public debt 
“proceedings,” under even the most capacious definition of that term.  There have only been 180 
sovereign debt restructurings from 1970 to 2010,7 and most of them have not reached Argentine 
levels of acrimony.8  So, too, are some defaults “too small fish to fry” for putative holdouts.9 All 
that being said, the fact that we see the holdout problem in Argentina, where approximately 
93%—surely a super-majority by whatever metric one uses—consented to the bond exchanges, 
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Nor ought one be assuaged by the rise of CACs (either payment or non-payment),11 
although to be sure this makes the severity of the holdout problem a closer question.  
Theoretically, CACs seem at first to be elegant solutions to the holdout problem, and their 
increased prevalence means either that the market thinks so too or that the market is close 
enough to thinking so that the signaling herd is stampeding thus.12  But serious commentators 
contend that CACs do not fix the holdout problem altogether,13 and their arguments have force.  
(Greece presents as stark recent example where CACs did not prevent holdouts.)14  Indeed, there 
are at least two ways in which holdout problems cannot be solved by CACs.  First, as an 
empirical matter, vulture funds (whom will be scapegoated as quintessential holdouts for 
expositional ease) may easily be able to marshal blocking positions, especially when a sovereign 
has issued multiple rounds of debt.15  Second, as a more structural matter, it could be that the 
legal community is so ingenious that anytime you think you’ve fixed something they just 
outmaneuver you at every turn.  Consider, for example, how seemingly unanimous Unanimous 



























others?)  Maybe those instances were outrages, or maybe they were just a manifestation of the 
legal world devising creative workarounds to transactional problems. 
The first, empirical point on the inefficacy of CACs is not theoretically problematic.  
Sure, anyone can hold out, whatever your voting threshold is, but there’s nothing that can be 
done about that.  (More specifically, the tougher one wants to make it to acquire a blocking 
position, the less consensus one must tolerate for the restructuring – because the voting threshold 
must be lowered – which means there is a zero-sum theoretical fight between consensus and 
holdout-potential.)17  The second point creates more concern.  It is difficult to escape the nagging 
feeling that CACs won’t do it all, even if they do do a lot.18  In any event, even if the happy 
outcome of CACs’ fixing much or all of the holdout problem comes to pass, we are still left with 
the legacy issue of pre-CAC issuances, which represent enough money that holdouts remain a 
serious problem to the restructuring of sovereign debt.19 Moreoever, it is far from clear this is a 
mere legacy issue, as some recent empirical scholarship suggests,20 and the specter of holdouts 








18 See Declaration of Stephen Choi at 8-10 NML Capital, Ltd. v. The Republic of Argentina 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168292 (Nov. 21, 2012) (No. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG), 90 Civ. 1707(TPG), 09 Civ. 














Accordingly, CACs or not, holdout is still a problem in the sovereign debt arena looking 
for solutions. 
 
II. Vulture Funds and the Problem of Costly, Uncoordinated Litigation. 
The second proposition that must be established before turning to the certification boards 
proposal regards vulture funds in particular: not only do they present a theoretical risk of 
holdout-ism – as seen with, for example, Peru22 – but they are excessively tenacious in their 
litigation strategies, which has systemic costs, both for the international community generally 
and for the development of a coherent body of sovereign debt law specifically.23 
Vulture funds are easy scapegoats for free-floating malaise,24 and policymakers have 
directed an inordinate amount of hostility in recent years toward hedge funds, perhaps preferring 
to point the finger at external investors as opposed to government regulators in laying blame to 











24 Funds are easy scapegoats for free-floating malaise. Consider, for example, the U.S. proposal 
to tax capital gains for hedge fund managers as constructive income, which one might safely 
characterize as a “novel” development under taxation law. S. 1626.IS, 110th Cong. (2007)l H.R. 1935 
(2009) (reintroduced). 
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limit hedge fund recoveries against sovereign debtors,25 an expressive gesture of ire (or at the 
very least an unprecedented “un-waiver” of sovereign immunity by another sovereign).26  But 
there’s surely something at the root of these grumblings.  In the sovereign debt area, vulture 
funds seem to be at the vanguard of using the private mechanism of litigation and judicial 
process to collect on defaulted sovereign debt.  Consider what happened with the Argentine debt 
and the ARA Fragata Libertad.27  Ellioit/NML refused to tender its bonds to the exchange offer 
put forth by Argentina (both pre- and post Lock Law),28 deciding instead to sue.  To realize its 
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leave substantial funds parked in the United States,30 and able to demur collections actions in its 
own courts, Argentina made this collection phase of the victorious plaintiffs a difficult one.31 
Undiscouraged, NML doggedly pursued Argentina for assets abroad, from Belgian 
diplomatic accounts to a colorful attempt on the presidential helicopter, Tango 1.32   It’s not that 
this aggressive style should offend our wilting-violet sensibilities; on the contrary, lawyers 
should be happy to create full employment for The Brotherhood. The issue is that, especially 
given the positive reinforcement the funds received for their holdout conduct with Peru,33 it is 
difficult to reject the hypothesis that their relentless strategy is animated more by a complex 
signaling game of pit-bulledness, designed to make it clear that they are here and here to stay and 
so a defaulting sovereign ought just to cough up and pay them off. 
Consider in this regard the detention of the Libertad in Ghana.34  The fund successfully 
arrested the vessel and brought it within the jurisdiction of the Ghanaian court.35  Although 
Argentina was ultimately able to prevail on a sovereign immunity defense (slow as she is, the 
Libertad is still a warship that enjoys the traditional immunity accorded such property under 























was willing to travel halfway around the world to arrest a vessel that in a best case scenario 
would have netted it 1% of its outstanding claim.37  True, ninety-nine more ships later the fund 
might have been made whole, but the jarring disconnect between the value of the claim and the 
legal effort involved in seizing such a remote asset raises the question whether NML was doing it 
just to posture for its larger holdout game. 
As an aside, you may wonder what’s wrong with posturing?  After all, if the funds are 
willing to pay for the lawyers to gain what they perceive is a tactical advantage, then that’s just 
more good news for The Brotherhood, isn’t it? The analysis may be more complex.  When 
private litigants invoke the international machinery of dispute resolution there are costs well 
beyond the filing fees.  When NML secured the attachment from the Ghanaian court, Argentina 
had to initiate a proceeding under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(“UNCLOS”), a treaty finally completed in 1982 to resolve maritime disputes, to resolve its 
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“provisional measures” to address the injunctive detention of her frigate.39  This required 
convening the rarely deployed International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (“ITLOS”).40 
The ITLOS has convened only twenty-odd times throughout its lifetime.41  Looking at the 
sorts of disputes it tends to hear, one sees such matters as seized fishing vessels due to capacious 
claims of exclusive economic zones.42  Nominally, Argentina’s beef was with Ghana,43 but it is 
clear to any observer that Argentina had to sue a private investment fund to get its own naval 
ship back.  It is not the obscurity of the tribunal on its own that is problematic; it is the fact that 
empanelling these tribunals has costs. Yes, some costs can be passed onto the parties,44 but there 
are myriad indirect costs that cannot. And when private parties can force the convening of 
tribunals that were themselves the result of delicate compromises of wary nations forging 
unsteady alliances in an international treaty, it can cheapen the broader field of international 



























UNCLOS)45 can point to such spectacles to say, “See, if we sign on we could get sued by some 
crazy hedge fund.”  It also forces public confrontation among nation states at the behest of 
private parties (e.g., Argentina had to sue Ghana, a country with which it was experiencing 
perfectly cordial relations).46 
These costs make it difficult to dismiss the convening of the ITLOS as harmless and fully 
internalized conduct.  On the contrary, it shows that vulture funds’ litigious impulses can have 
real and serious adverse consequences.  If that is so, the primary reason for which they initiate 
such international actions, namely, to gain leverage in their holdout negotiations, must be re-
analyzed through the lens of cost-imposition onto other actors. 
* * * 
Taking these two propositions together—the incentive for vulture fund holdout and the 
amenability of those funds to initiate litigation to assist their holdout strategy—we should predict 
a high number of vulture fund lawsuits in sovereign debt restructurings. Whether we actually see 
that, though, is unclear, because available evidence suggests that much sovereign debt is 
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recent empirical data.48  Moreover, even if the absolute litigation rate is low, the relative one is 
high;49 that is, even if there’s not a lot of litigation out there yet, when there is litigation, the 
vulture funds are frequently present, and their rising prevalence in holding publicly issued 
sovereign debt predicts a worsening of the problem. 
Indeed, it is the still-relative infrequency of litigation that ironically exacerbates the 
negative influence of vulture funds.  The problem is because there is such a thin precedent book, 
there’s no comfort zone of relevant case law for judges to fall back upon when presented with a 
legal challenge by such a tenacious litigant.  Judges are nevertheless asked to make important 
policy decisions in one-off interventions that occur every few years, a task to which they are 
poorly suited.  The litigiousness of vulture funds exacerbates this problem.50  As the funds 
become increasingly emboldened to start lawsuits all around the world, they are dragging the 
enforcement of sovereign debt into the courtrooms rather than the halls of the IMF.51  Judges 
can’t hide from these cases, and there is no reason to believe vulture funds will drop their 
lawsuits without having succeeded in extorting a higher payout. 
Doubtless stemming from this lack of experience and familiarity, courts of general 
jurisdiction— at least in the United States— can botch things up. The widespread criticism of the 


















at pains to point out it would be much better if there was an organized collective proceeding, like 
a bankruptcy, to resolve the dispute,53 almost as if it resented having to adjudicate a restructuring 
through the agenda-setting of one creditor.  For those jurisdictions without specialized 
insolvency or business tribunals, confronting sovereign debt problems in the posture of a general 
civil action for breach of contract is especially awkward.54 
In the NML case, a striking example of the lack of familiarity shown to matters of debt 
default comes from the Second Circuit and SDNY’s treatment of the pari passu clause with 
Argentina.55  As discussed already above, the most troubling policy outcome with this case is the 
perverse holdout incentive it creates by paying the holdouts more than the cooperators. Brushing 
aside the concerns of the United States as Amicus curiae, the lower court expressed mystification 
as to why there was a holdout problem at all: any “holding out,” it reasoned, was largely a 
consequence of Argentina’s staunch refusal to make payment on its defaulted bonds, not the 
recalcitrance of the vulture funds.56  If you just capitulated and paid, implied the court, you 
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Bracketing for the moment whether the court was serious in this comment (there is more 
to this case than meets the eye),57 let’s assume, just for sake of argument, the court really thought 
there was not a holdout problem afoot.  That’s astonishing.  Saying they’ll go away if you just 
pay them a bit more than all the others is what a holdout problem is.  Accordingly, if we take the 
court at its word— that it really doesn’t see any holdout problem— then we have a vivid 
illustration of generalist courts that don’t see lots of bankruptcy actions “getting it wrong,” 
relying upon reasoning most steeped in bankruptcy law would consider absurd.58 
As such, the real problem of private enforcement of sovereign debt by vulture funds is 
not just the gratuitous invocation of international judicial apparatuses, but the development of a 
lurching, disorganized, ad hoc casebook of judicial precedent on sovereign debt, all spun out by 
busy jurists who have little expertise on the subject matter.  That leads to bad legal outcomes, or 
at the very least naïve legal outcomes.59  Worse, if the merits of the NML case are allowed to 
stand, the incentive for these holdouts has just increased astronomically, auguring a worsening of 






















fretted that NML will “give holdout creditors greater leverage.”)61  This concern doesn’t even get 
into the problem of potentially conflicting judgments from different tribunals on, e.g., the proper 
contractual interpretation of a given clause in a bond issuance (although the choice of law and 
forum clauses help mute that problem somewhat, albeit it at the cost of concentrating it all on 
New York law, as now interpreted by the Second Circuit).  Leaving aside political viability, one 
benefit from a SDRM framework would at the least be an evolving coherent jurisprudence, 
something the unfolding status quo inhibits.62 
Accordingly, sovereign debt restructuring faces a continued and ongoing problem of how 
to deal with holdouts, even in an age of the CAC.  The presence of vulture funds crystallizes this 
theoretical potential in a way that has not just the direct negative consequence of the holdout qua 
holdout, but of the indirect problems stemming from a robust litigation appetite that leads to the 
inappropriate use of a fragile international legal framework and the development of a potentially 
disruptive ad hoc book of legal precedent in domestic courts.  The time is thus ripe for private-
fund-directed reform.  
III. An International Certification Board for Sovereign Debt Restructuring. 
Before turning to the certification board proposal, we must pause to ask whether the 
forgoing discussion has proved too much.  That is, if all these evils with vulture funds are so, 
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curtail the rights of these funds to sue for private enforcement of sovereign debt upon default?63  
After all, the simplest and most direct solution to a perceived danger of vulture fund litigation 
would surely be to clamp down on such lawsuits directly.  If the market doesn’t do so itself (with 
the promulgation of litigation-vote clauses or vesting litigation powers in indenture trustees), 
there are plentiful ways this could be done by the state: buffing up immunity doctrines, 
resurrection of champerty laws, etc. 
 The problem is overdeterrence.  Sometimes these funds do provide a valuable 
monitoring function, as others before have eloquently demonstrated.64 Consider for a recent 
example the healthy role of vulture funds in the recent private-law insolvency case of Vitro in 
Mexico.65  Although Vitro was a private company, it was a big enough player that analysis of the 
case within a discussion of sovereign debt is not inappropriate. In Vitro,66 the Mexican company 
proposed a concurso plan that sought to cut around half the bondholder debt but allow equity to 
retain much of its interest.67  It did so pursuant to a majority vote of creditors, but those creditors 
included inter-company obligations (allegedly manufactured by the debtor to gerrymander the 





















bondholders extinguished.68  There, it was investment consortia—including vulture funds—that 
blew the whistle and challenged the Mexican proceedings in U.S. court.69  (Actually, per the 
previous observations on vulture fund litigation appetite, they did so everywhere—Mexico, the 
U.S., both state and federal court70—you name it.) 
Particularly telling in that case was how the Mexican debtor tried to demonize the funds.  
For example, it argued that the bondholders shouldn’t whine about their treatment under 
Mexican law because some of them, like vulture funds, bought the debt at a steep discount well 
after default.71   Yet the funds were ultimately vindicated, from bankruptcy court up to the Fifth 
Circuit,72 true to the predictions of those who say these investment funds can serve an important 
monitoring function, whether through policing debtor misconduct or exposing behavior that 
tramples on the rights of minority stakeholders. The funds in Vitro protected significant value for 
retail and other investors. As mentioned, Vitro is not a sovereign case (at least not nominally, 
although there was apparently some dispute about the extent to which Mexican governmental 
thumbs were on the scales). Still, it serves as a stark illustration of the “good” side of vulture 
funds: scrappy litigants who won’t roll over when told that “that’s just the way the law works 
over here.”  This is wholly in addition to the market-facilitating role some say they serve in 
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confirmation of a plan: if they have an exit strategy, they will keep the pressure on for plan 
confirmation.73 
Reconsidering Argentina, we must ask ourselves which narrative applies.  On the one 
hand, a picture has been painted of a voracious litigant willing to take matters all the way to the 
high seas to hunt down extraterritorial assets of a defaulting sovereign.  But on the other hand, 
Argentina’s recalcitrance is well known.74  In fact, even under the well-respected regime of the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSD”)75— where all sorts of 
countries who are hardly poster children for the rule of law cough up awards— Argentina has 
steadfastly refused to pay when losing (on the theory that no-one has come to Argentina and 
asked to domesticate such an award).76  The Lock Law and its suspension hardly evince a 
willingness to negotiate with remaining creditors, and the senior governmental officials’ 
repeated, almost gleeful announcements that they have no intention whatsoever of paying any 
old debtholders seems verging on anarchic, especially in light of the country’s improved 

























moral concerns might be engaged,79  but Argentina seems to take the position that her 
intransigence is pour encourager les autres not to hold out: NML had its chance, got greedy, and 
so now has to pay the price.80 
Judge Griesa’s exasperation with the Republic is thinly veiled and drips from the pages of 
the Federal Reporter.81  This anger harkens back to the prior point of whether he really doesn’t 
think there’s a holdout problem in this case.  An alternative and equally likely interpretation is 
that the judge thinks that any holdout problem is trivial in comparison to the flagrant contempt 
for legal process, including his own orders, shown by Argentina.82  This view would be 
consistent with a narrative that frames Argentina less as the victim of voracious ship-scavenging 
vultures and more as abusive, Vitro-like (vitreous?) juggernauts stampeding over the rights of 
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how to decide whether a vulture fund is being “good” or being “bad.”  Judge Griesa clearly 
thought NML was being good (or, perhaps more accurately, better than Argentina),83 but what 
are we to make with his seemingly poor familiarity with the concept of a holdout problem? 
The conceit of this article is to try to offer a new proposal that captures the good side of 
fund behavior but curbs its bad side.  Great work has been done already in this area offering 
reform proposals,84 and so the additional contribution of this article is modest.  It is also mindful 
of the pragmatic and political impediments to some of these theoretically attractive proposals, 
such as the SDRM.  (If it was a good idea in the early 2000s, it’s an even better idea now post 
(intra?) Great Recession.) The IMF, for example, has previously noted the theoretical 
attractiveness of the SDRM, stating that it “preserves the economic value of assets and facilitates 
a return to medium-term viability, and thereby reduces the costs of the restructuring process” and 
“should also be expected to improve the functioning of the capital markets.”85 The Fund has 
recently been forced to concede, however, that the proposal “received considerable support 
within the Board, but failed to command the majority needed to amend the Fund’s Article of 
Agreement due to the members’ reluctance to surrender the degree of sovereignty required to 
establish such a framework.”86 Accordingly, the time has come for modest innovation to move 


















The preference for a more modest policy innovation than, for example, a supranational 
sovereign debt insolvency tribunal is not a coward’s slide to second best.  It is driven by a 
sentiment akin to that expressed in Professor Tarullo’s article about the virtues of the unspecified 
and the inchoate in international matters such as sovereign debt restructuring.87  Sometimes when 
consensus is difficult to achieve, matters are best elided and left for a later day when resistance 
may have changed.  In this vein, it may actually be not all that bad that we don’t yet have an 
SRDM.  Maybe we’re just not ready for it yet. If so, then ad hoc incrementalism may be the best 
recipe.88 
Accordingly, given that the holdout problem is unlikely to be solved anytime soon by a 
broadly adopted macro-level policy proposal (except maybe regionally—keep trying, Europe!),89 
a different approach might be to try a much more modest next step: a Board of Certification for 
sovereign debt restructuring proposals.  The idea would be to give such a Board the power to 
“bless” a sovereign’s proposal as generally complying with standards of procedural fairness and 
minority protection, following kind of an aggregated customary international law of financial 
default.90  It would do so in broad terms only and deliberately eschew getting into the details of 
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Board would thus be remedially toothless.  For example, it would have no power to compel 
compliance or resolve priority disputes.  Those matters would have to await whatever judicial 
processes the parties might choose to engage.  To be sure, the Board could perhaps have rosters 
of arbitrators that parties to a dispute related to the sovereign debt might avail themselves,91 but 
the Board would be, by design, nonadjudicatory.  The reason for this hobbling-by-design is that 
international institutions tend to garner support in inverse proportion to the power they wield.  In 
this sense, the Board would occupy a middle ground between a statutory (SDRM) and market-
based (CAC) approach, with the atmospherics of the former but the party autonomy of the 
latter.92 
Just what could such a Board actually do, then?  That is, if by design the Board is to be 
defanged of any adjudicatory power, will it be able to have any relevance in the rough and 
tumble state of nature of sovereign debt default?  Tentative yes: the Board can have an impact.  
First, it is worth noting that the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders and the Foreign 
Bondholders Protective Council carried great weight in recommending settlements with U.K. 
sovereign bondholders even though they had no authority to commit individual creditors to 
anything.93  (They are surely inspirations for the Gitlin and House idea of a “Sovereign Debt 



















entity can carry great weight in the investment world. Second, the Board can also have an impact 
even with more litigiously inclined investors.  Consider that the chief role the Board could play 
is that its non-binding declarations of restructuring proposals being compliant (or non-compliant) 
with generally fair treatment of creditors could then be relied upon by non-expert, generalist 
judges in later domestic court proceedings who might be called upon to exercise judicial 
discretion.  In systems that accord such judges wide discretion (e.g., perhaps arrest of a foreign 
vessel is a discretionary form of relief a libellant might seek, not an automatic right), that 
discretion can then be exercised in the light of knowing whether the sovereign has been playing 
fair or not and, by implication, whether the private party litigant, which we’ll assume is a vulture 
fund, is a presumptive holdout. Creditors fighting such a “board-certified” restructuring can of 
course never be deprived of their pre-existing contractual and property rights; that would require 
some binding legal authority, such as a sovereign bankruptcy code, which is still quite some way 
off. But they will have to seek whatever legal relief they do want as either participants or non-
participants in a board-certified (or uncertified) proceeding, with all the attendant atmospheric 
baggage that that status might entail. 
To offer just one example, the certification proposal is a kindred spirit to the idea of 
“plain vanilla” financial products to be regulated by the new Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (“CFPB”) in the United States.95    Heterogeneous financial products are still permitted 
with few outright bans, but some that receive an administrative seal of approval will be protected 
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a SDRM or other mechanism to provide firm legal consequences (be they carrots or sticks) for 
certification means that a certification’s punch will necessarily be less significant than, for 
example, being a “qualified residential mortgage” by the CFBP,96  but it’s a start for an 
international world.97  In fact, this lack of strong compulsive power might be seen as a cognate to 
the denuded authority a U.S. bankruptcy judge holds in a chapter 9 bankruptcy proceeding (for 
municipal and other public debtors).98  Thus, the fact that certifications cannot “force” any legal 
outcome just means they are yet another form of soft—very soft—international law (perhaps 
even soft non-law?).  But the international realm has long countenanced degrees of hardness in 
legal reforms,99 and so international lawyers, one hopes, can readily anticipate certification by a 
respected board carrying some non-trivial weight.  (Moreover, wholly apart from the certification 
itself is the process: the Board’s procedure in reviewing a workout proposal will facilitate the 
transparent exchange of information and dialogue – hugely important requirements for efficient 
resolution of sovereign financial distress.) 
The tougher question is even if, in the abstract, a certification could exert some softest of 
soft law effect on commercial actors, what about vulture funds, with their hardnosed litigation 























we won’t know ‘til we try it.  But we can have theoretical predictions, and even admitting the 
need for speculation, there is reason to believe there is a chance for impact. The basis for this 
optimism is the degree to which the current system substantially requires the exercise of 
discretionary judicial power.100  Even if funds are impervious to norms, they do respect power. 
Already a suspicious class of plaintiffs, vulture funds will surely appreciate their disadvantaged 
status walking into court as opponents of a “board-certified” sovereign debt restructuring 
proposal. 
Consider, indeed, the injunction as the quintessential equitable request at Anglo-
American law.  Assume that Judge Griesa had been confronted with injunction requests from 
NML after the hypothetical Board of Certification had approved the Argentine proposal as a 
legitimate conciliation of debts that 93% of creditors had gone along with it.  While he may have 
come out the exact same way in his ruling, it is also possible that the creditors’ then-exposed 
recalcitrance would make him view Argentina’s own intransigence against these creditors in a 
different light.  In fact, taking an innovative tool from U.S. bankruptcy law, an injunction-
deciding judge might even adopt a reverse-injunction rule and enjoin holdout creditor collection 
actions until after creditors accepting haircuts are paid under a board-certified proposal.101  This 
sort of “channeling injunction” sometimes used in U.S. mass-tort cases would be a way of 
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worried about going out on a limb with such an innovation could always cite the existence of a 
certification as a comity-based justification for extraordinary judicial cooperation.  (On the other 
side of the restructuring ledger – what would motivate a sovereign to seek board approval? – the 
worries are slighter.  Sovereign debtors will fear market punishment, and there’s always the stick 
of IMF conditionality that could conceivably be brandished.)103 
As for who should staff such a Board, presumable starting candidates might be the IMF 
or even World Bank, although there may be political reasons why they might be undesirable 
choices.104  The UN— more specifically, UNCITRAL— might be another possibility.  ICSID is 
another candidate.  In contrast to the proposals of others who want to decentralize control onto 
the several states of the world,105 this proposal embraces centralization, piggybacking off the 
reputation of some hoary international body, all the while making clear that the ensuing Board 





























The tougher question to address is selecting the criteria by which a proposal would be 
rated for certification by the Board.  One good initiative, from Governor Trichet, is the Code of 
Conduct for sovereign debt restructuring.107  The Board could certify whether the proposal 
complies with the Code of Conduct.  In general, the idea is to keep the criteria as procedurally 
and non-substantively focused as possible (straying far afield from those commentators who 
suggest fixed haircuts be written into law as a substantive requirement imposed on creditors).108  
Indeed, consider the criteria discussed in the Code of Conduct: matters such as whether the 
creditors were accorded representation rights, including the formation of a committee; whether 
the sovereign negotiated with stakeholders in good faith; etc.109  Borrowing just for sake of 
argument some ideas from the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, it probably would not make sense to have 
a “best interest test” analysis,110  which gauges what the creditors might get in a hypothetical 
liquidation.  But there can be analysis of basic procedural safeguards in the reorganization 
context.  This could take a page from the IMF’s playbook, which has upped its insistence on 
permitting creditor representation with requiring “good-faith effort” to negotiate with creditors 
(although qualifying that that can arise through informal consultation before a take-it-or-leave-it 
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Additionally, the Certification Board can decide whether there has been equal, non-
discriminatory treatment of creditors, although this is an area where sovereign debt departs from 
purely private corporate debt restructuring. This last point is an area where some caution must be 
exercised.  Sovereign debt workouts often have differential treatment, as seen just recently with 
the Seychelles and Belize. 112  Indeed, the Code of Conduct suggests public sector debt should be 
outright disenfranchised if “directly or indirectly owned or controlled by the sovereign issuer and 
its public sector,” which makes sense given the different stakes involved.113  This is an area still 
in some flux, though: The IIF Principles at first suggested that private creditors should not be 
asked to restructures their debt without buy-in from public bilateral creditors to share the pain – 
which the IMF in characteristic understatement said “could prove controversial” – but later toned 
down its Principles in later 2012 (post-Greece, where there was much grumbling that domestic 
banks, who held half the debt, sold out on the cheap to stay in good with the government on 
whom they in turn might need support)114 to insist only upon fair and equal treatment of all 
claims, meaning that no creditor group should be excluded ex ante.115  The IMF thinks this initial 
stance is too strong and points out that “[i]n some cases, creditors may accept some 
differentiation in the treatment of their claims, either to better fit with individual creditor 

















maintain market access and preserve financial stability.”116  The point is not to resolve this hot 
potato issue right now, it is merely to observe that the Certification Board could assess whether, 
once the potato has cooled and a consensus standard emerges (and we will get there), compliance 
has been achieved.117   
Other areas where the Board might weigh in could be general comportment with the 
principles of absolute priority (which would arise with quasi-sovereign entities like banks, a 
question that in turn would depend on the Board’s scope).  For secured creditors, too, attention 
can be paid to the adequate preservation of liens, etc.  Even with thorny issues, such as priorities, 
the Board could possibly decide whether any claim inversion is appropriate, perhaps following 
local insolvency law.  The Board might even get into the sustainability question, delving into 
insolvency vs. liquidity distress, but that might be getting into matters that are too delicate.  The 
point is for this to be light-touch analysis.118 
The hardest thing might be questions of valuation and sustainability.  That is, the gist of 
the moral hazard concern in sovereign debt default is whether the sovereign can pay its debts but 
just doesn’t want to.119  The Board could weigh in on this, perhaps using an open-ended standard 














Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013
30 
 
flexibility-favoring approach of the IMF.120  This wanders, however, into factually disputed 
issues from which the Certification Board ought to steer clear.  But even so, many defaults are so 
clearly the consequence of financial distress it is hard to envision serious dispute.121  Would 
anyone doubt Argentina was in financial distress back in 2001?  Again, a U.S. analogy might 
provide some instruction, such as to the gatekeeping factors to a chapter 9 municipal 
reorganization that must be shown to establish a good-faith need to restructure debt.122  (The hard 
case is odious debt default; I am candidly uncertain whether I would suggest the Board to assess 
odiousness, which seems straying perhaps too far from the technocratic to the political.)123 
One thing that ought to be beyond the Board’s purview would be mediating a priority 
dispute across different bond issuances.  Suppose a default trigger would launch a subsequent 
issuance into priority over a prior issuance.  Getting the Board in the middle of deciding the 
(surely contested) issue of the triggering event might mire it into the powerful side-picking from 
which this proposal tries to spare it.  If the Board gets involved in dispute resolution, it loses its 
capacity of being an above-the-fray arbiter of generic fairness.  Two possible solutions could 
work around this concern.  First, the Board could conceivably get into contingent certification 
(i.e., if X, then Y is fair, etc.), but that might be logistically too complicated.  Alternatively, the 
Board could recommend (even endorse) specific claims-ranking disputes to be sent to 
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arbitration over litigation in commercial matters)124 is that it avoids the state-affiliation of a home 
court or the need to create an international one. True, many bond issuances already contain 
choice of law and forum clauses,125 but the carving out of specific disputes for arbitration 
resolution can de-politicize a potentially fractious scenario.  It also avoids the issue of asset-
flight concerns for sovereign defendants.  What it doesn’t solve, of course, is whether the arbitral 
awards will ever be enforced. Keeping on the present example, Argentina has a good track 
record of participating in several investor-state arbitrations (winning many) but has a poor record 
of paying adverse awards.126  The recent certification of the Italian class action against sovereign 
debt action under its BIT will be worth watching closely.127 
If the purpose of this certification board proposal is to provide some “reputational 
pressure” on sovereign debt stakeholders to come to consensus in the face of, say, a bond 
exchange offering, then there arises a timing complication.  The proposal has a perhaps stylized 
scenario in which first a haircut is proposed, then creditors quietly cogitate over its terms as a 
Certification Board offers its imprimatur, and finally the process of voting and tendering begins.  
In domestic bankruptcy proceedings, such orderliness is not always the case. That point on its 
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glacial timeline without too many prepacks.128  The harder point is that even if a proposal is fair 
in the abstract, at what threshold does one declare that there has been “a holdout”?  That 
determination requires an independent factual input wholly distinct from the underlying terms of 
the proposal – an assessment of the significance of the number of creditors who have gone 
along.129  Suppose a sovereign proposes an eminently fair haircut, offered to its creditors in an 
above-board, nondiscriminatory manner, but then encounters genuine, good-faith lack of interest 
from the creditors.  If everyone’s holding out, that’s not holdout – that’s just unfortunate.  Can 
the Certification Board do anything about this? 
It’s not clear.  Yes, of course the Board could opine on this or any question.  (One can 
envision an intelligible holdout standard that would not require a fixed voting cut-off, like 75%; 
it could just be a standard, like “overwhelming majority.”)  The issue is how to deal with the 
timing problem.  The Board’s main work will be to certify an exchange proposal as “legitimate.”  
For example, there was some suggestion that the initial Argentine offering—a “take it or leave 
it” offer—was too heavy-handed to allow for meaningful negotiation;130 those are the precise 
sorts of issues in which the Board should ideally get involved.  But that all occurs pre-voting.  If 
we drag the Board back in ex post to cast the official condemnation of “holdout” on someone 
who didn’t go along with the tender, we insert the Board into a far more powerful and 


















Board is designed to have.  Accordingly, to let the Board give an official scarlet H to the vulture 
funds who are holding out is probably a bridge too far.  Instead we should just let domestic 
courts put two and two together by coupling the Board’s certification and the creditor votes to 
draw their own conclusions. 
Could this actually work?  Hard to say, but there is little downside to trying, other than 
the opportunity cost of distracting from something more whole-hog like SRDM if there’s 
burgeoning political will to make that happen.  (There’s not.)131  Absent opportunity cost 
concerns, the Board could be a small step in corralling the vulture funds (and other actors) in the 
sovereign debt world into more rational resolution of sovereign financial distress.  How much a 
role the Board has of course depends upon multiple factors, including a grittily legal-realist 
assessment of just how judges interpret open law.  For example, this article has made the modest 
argument that surely certification could be a relevant factor of decision in weighing the propriety 
of equitable relief.  A more radical suggestion—which of course is merely raised academically—
would be to speculate that certification might affect more substantive legal determinations.  We 
may leave as a thought experiment whether, in the presence of such a certification, Judge Griesa 
might have been inclined to take the narrower interpretation of the para passu clause advocated 
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